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INTRODUCTION
This Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is for the Advanced Microwave Sounding
Unit-A (AMSU-A) instruments that are being designed and manufactured for the Meteorological Satellites
Project (METSAT) and the Earth Observing System (EOS) integrated programs. This FlVIEA analyzes the
design of the METSAT and EOS instruments as they currently exist. This FMEA is intended to identify
METSAT and EOS failure modes and their effect on spacecraft-instrument and instrument-component
interfaces. The prime objective of this FMEA is to identify potential catastrophic and critical failures so
that susceptibility to the failures and their effects can be eliminated from the METSAT/EOS instruments.
As described in Section 7, the instrument is partitioned into an Antenna Subsystem (AS), a
Receiver Subsystem (RS) and an Electronics Subsystem (ES). The subsystems are partitioned into an A1
module and an A2 module. The Antenna and Receiver Subsystems are common for METSAT and EOS
except for a compensation assembly in the Antenna Subsystem A2 Module (A2AS). Reliability block
diagrams are provided for the METSAT Electronics Subsystem A1 Module (A1ES-METSAT), and the A2
Module (A2ES-METSAT), the EOS Electronics Subsystem A1 module, and the A2 module (A2ES-EOS). A
summary of this indexing is shown in Table I.
Table I Component Summary Index
I
AMSU Component J Index
METSAT/EOS Common
A1 Module AntennaSubsystem AlAS
A2 Module AntennaSubsystem A2AS
A1 Module Receiver Subsystem A1RS
A2 Module Receiver Subsystem A2.RS
METSAT Unique
A1 Module Electronics Subsystem
A2 Module Electronics Subsystem
EOS Unique
A1ES-METSAT2 -
A1 Module Electronics Subsystem
A2 Module Electronics Subsystem A1ES-EOS2 -
1.1 Scope
This is an integrated report that documents both the FM:EA and Critical Items List (CIL)
results (attached as Appendix B) for the METSAT and EOS instruments and has been prepared and
submitted in accordance with contract NAS 5-32314, Contract Document Requirements List (CDRL) items
108 and 507, respectively. This report meets the requirements of 7.3.1 of the Performance Assurance
Requirements document GSFC-S-480-79 and has been prepared in contractor format using Flight
Assurance Procedure FAP P-302-720 as a guide.
1.2 Purpose
This is the final submittal of the FMEA and CIL. It will be updated as necessary if new or
modified failure modes are identified because of changes in the design or changes in the safety or mission
performance requirements.
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Section 2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 METSAT/EOS Results
The FMEA process started with NASA contract NAS 5-29402 for the K-L-M instrument, and
the results from this FMEA were reported March 1990, Report 8183-2. This report was first revised and
updated for the EOS AMSU-A instrument as NASA Preliminary Report 10378, dated August 1994. This
FMEA METSAT/EOS updated report 10378 has been revised to include FMEA results for both METSAT
and EOS AMSU-A instruments. Table II provides METSAT changes from K-L-M. Differences between
EOS and METSAT instruments are discussed in 7.2 and 7.3 herein.
Table II AMSU-A METSAT Changes From K-L-M
Item Change
A1 Upper Card Rack Changed from 4 CCA to 2 CCA
(2 motor driven CCA).
A1 Lower Card Rack New Relay Driver CCA added, requiring
shiftingof other cards one slot.
A2 Card Rack 2 CCA deleted, 1 CCA added, 7 CCA shifted
2 slots in card rack.
Motor Drive Transistors Were bulkhead mounted and hard-wired, now
are integral part of cable assembly as
transistor/diode assembly
DC-DC converter New design
System Interconnect New connectorized harness
CPU CCA Different RAM used and additional clock
buffering added.
Analog MUX and ND CCA Part of radiation latchup removal redesigned.
Motor Driver CCA Current and gain limiter resistors moved to
power relay assembly. Diodes moved to
Transistor/Diode assy.
Power Control Relay and Analog No longer used.
Housekeeping CCA
28V Switching Assy and Power Distribution No longer used.
Terminal Boards
PLO Relay Moved from deleted Power Control Logic CCA
to Receiver shelf.
Reason for Change
Power Control Logic and Analog
Housekeeping CCA combined for improved
reliability
Repositioning of cards to minimize risk of
crosstalk and maximize interconnect
efficiency.
Repositioning of cards to minimize risk of
crosstalk and maximize interconnect
efficiency.
Wired as part of cable assy to eliminate wiring
at system level, combined with transient
suppression diodes on assy for best
performance.
Power requirements changed because of
change from GDO to DRO in receiver and
new supplier.
Reduce system noise and reduce integration
and test time.
A. RAM discontinued
B. Buffer drive margin added
Dual PNP transistor no longer available.
Removes motor drive current from A2 card
cage to minimize system noise, A1 modified
for commonality.
High current functions in A1 upper card cage
moved to new Power Relay Assembly and to
new Relay Driver CCA.
Functions now contained in new Power Relay
Assembly.
CCA deleted
2.1.1 Potential Failure Modes Problem Areas
The CIL provided in Appendix B is a list of failure modes identified by their criticality to
system operations and additional problem areas that have been identified.
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2.1.2 Items Exempted from the FMEA
Software and its effect on system operation was not analyzed in this FMEA.
2. 2 Conclusions
This report reflects the identified failure modes related to the METSAT/EOS instruments as
they currently exist. Design analysis is pending for a potential loss of signal processing (and other
functions) caused by a short on the output of the DC/DC converters. All other identified failure modes are
considered acceptable operational risks.
The METSAT/EOS AMSU-A instruments have one redundannt circuit. This circuit
provides redundant 57.290344GHz PLO for channels 9 through 14 (see Figure 13). Only one PLO is active
during operation, and switching is provided by a latching relay, having two coils, one for each position of
the contacts. One contract position selects the primary PLO, the other position selects the redundant PLO.
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Section 4
DEFINITIONS
The following defmitions apply to this FMEA:
4.1 Assembly
A number of parts or subassemblies or any combination thereof joined together to perform a
specific function and capable of disassembly (e.g., radio frequency amplifier, bearing assembly).
4.2 Compensating Features
Compensating features are special inspections, tests, controls, instructions, drawing notes,
or other provisions applied to a single-point-failure mode item to improve or enhance reliability.
4.3 Component
Assembly or any combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies, mounted together,
normally capable of independent operation in a variety of situations (e.g., electric motor, electronic power
supply, thruster, radio receiver). Note: The size of an item is a consideration in some cases. An electric
motor for a clock may be considered as a part, as it is not normally subject to disassembly. A component is
not a part. See equivalent term of unit.
4.4 Correlated or Sympathetic Failure
The inability of two (or more) redundant items to perform their function as the result of
some single event, thus possibly negating the redundancy and acting as a single-point-failure mode
(SPFM); e.g., loss of a raceway containing redundant power leads or a pyrotechnic shock causing parallel
relays to chatter.
4.5 Failure
The inability of an item to perform within previously specified limits.
4.6 Failure Effect
The consequence of the failure mode including primary and secondary effects.
4.7 Failure Cause
The cause of the failure mode.
4.8 Failure Mode
The way or manner in which an item fails.
4.9 Item
A nonspecific term used to denote any product, including systems, materials, parts,
subassemblies, sets, accessories, etc.
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4.10 Part
One piece, or two or more pieces joined together that are not normally subject to
disassembly without destruction of designed use (e.g., transistor, integrated circuit, screw, gear,
transformer).
4.11 Single-Point Failure (SPF)
Any piece part, assembly, component, or element of construction, such as printed circuit
board layout, the failure of which would result in irreversible degradation of item mission performance
below contractually specified levels, such as failure of an item in operation which could be catastrophic to a
mission objective. (A SPFM is a single-point-failure mode.)
4.12 Subsystem
A combination of components which performs an operational function within a system and is
a major subdivision of the system.
4.13 System
A composite of equipment, skills, and techniques capable of performing or supporting an
operational role, or both. A complete system includes all equipment, related facilities, material, software,
services, and personnel required for its operation and support to the degree that it can be considered a self-
sufficient item in its intended operational environment. The term system is used to refer to the highest
level of requirements and resource grouping applicable to the particular contract and analysis.
4.14 Unit
See the equivalent term component. For the purposes of this document, the terms may be
interchanged; the term commonly used in a particular program should be used to reduce ambiguity.
6
A/D
Amp
AMSU
Attn
BPF
Calib
CCA
CMOS
CPU
DET
EOS
FIFO
GFSC
GIRD
IF
ISO
I&D
LO
METSAT
MUX
PLO
PRT
RAM
R/D
SAW
TCG
Typ
UIID
Section 5
ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
Abbreviations/Acronyms
Analog/Digital
Amplifier
Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit
Attenuator
Bandpass Filter
Calibration
Circuit Card Assembly
Ceramic Metal Oxide Semiconductor
Central Processing Unit
Detector
Earth Observing System
First In, First Out
Goddard Space Flight Center
General Interface Requirements Document
Intermediate Frequency
Isolator
Integrate and Dump
Local Oscillator
Meteorological Satellites
Multiplexer
Phase-Locked Oscillator
Platinum Resistance Thermistor
Random Access Memory
Resolver/Digital Converter
Surface Acoustic Wave
Timing Control Generator
Typical
Unique Instrument Interface Document
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Section 6
FMEA DESCRIPTION
6.1 General procedure
6.1.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Methodology
This submittal of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the EOS and METSAT
Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) is the result of analyzing the design as it currently
exists. This FMEA was prepared using GSFC FAP P-302-2-720 as a guide. In this analysis, we have first
conducted a system interface FMEA_ This analysis identifies and analyzes the interface between the
AMSU-A Modules A1 and A2 and the spacecraft. These interfaces include thermal, electrical, mechanical,
communication, telemetry, and command and control. The FMEA is based on engineering judgment of the
failure modes that could be encountered in the critical AMSU-A-to-spacecraft interface. Failures in any one
of the subsystems that could cause thermal, electrical, or mechanical damage or degradation to any of the
other two subsystems is reviewed in this FMEA.
6.1.2 FMEA Worksheets
Appendixes A and B contain the FMEA worksheets for the AMSU-A. The column headings
are as follows:
a. Identification Number A serial number or other reference designation
identification number assigned for traceability
purposes.
b. Item/Functional
Identification
The name or nomenclature of the item or system
function being analyzed.
c. Function A concise statement of the function performed by the
hardware item.
d. Failure Modes Describes the known or possible ways the item can
fail.
Failure Causes Describes the physics of the failure.
e. Mission Phase/
Operational Mode
A concise statement of the mission phase and
operational mode in which the failure occurs.
f. Failure Effects
Next Higher Level Effect of the failure mode on the next higher
assembly.
Mission Effects Immediate or long-term effect on the AMSU-A
mission.
g. Failure Detection
Method
Self explanatory. In general, failures will be
detected by examining the telemetry equipment
status data and the serial output data stream.
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h. Compensating
Provisions
Those steps taken to minimize frequency and
severity on the AMSU-A mission.
i. Severity Class Classification of the consequences of a failure mode.
jo Failure Probability Qualitative evaluation which roughly corresponds to
preliminary reliability estimates.
These worksheets are provided in Appendix A.
The failure probability or failure rate is designated as frequent, reasonably probable,
occasional, remote, or extremely unlikely. Assignments are on the basis of the mean-time-between-failure
(MTBF), in hours, for this design. The following scale was used as a guide:
Probability of a single-failure mode which is:
P > 0.20 0.10 <P> 0.20 0.01 P < 0.10 0.001 P < 0.01 P < 0.001
Frequent Reasonably Occasional Remote Extremely
Probable Unlikely
P = the overall probability of failure during the operational time interval (3 years).
6.1.3 Severity Levels
Identification of mission-critical items is provided on each worksheet by assigning a severity
category to each failure mode. The severity classifications are as defined in GSFC-S-480-79, Paragraph
7.3.1.
Criticality 1. A single failure that could result in loss of human life or serious
injury to personnel, or loss of a launch facility, the launch vehicle, or a primary
mission objective. (For failures involving potential loss of life or serious injury to
personnel, redundant design, both of which if failed would result in a Criticality 1
failure, shall be considered Criticality 1.)
II Criticality 2. A single failure that could result in damage to a launch facility or
launch vehicle, significant degradation of science products (as defmed by the
Project), or loss of a secondary mission objective.
III Criticality 3.
failure mode.
6.1.4 Mission Profile
Loss of redundancy or an effect less severe than that of a Criticality 2
A mission time of 3 years operation in space with a goal of 5 years is used as specified by
GSFC, with no maintenance or repair.
6.2
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Ground Rules and Assumptions
The analysis is based on the following:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
Neither the METSAT nor the EOS is energized until the desired orbit is achieved
(except for pre- launch testing).
This analysis apphes to the normal operating mode.
Failure modes and causes are all time-independent. That is, there are no failure
modes nor applicable corrective actions that relate to time as a factor.
There are no symptoms and warnings prior to failure occurrence. There may be
exceptions to this, but they are very few.
The ground rules for failure selection are as follows:
1. Only one failure will be considered at a time.
2. Redundant elements will be analyzed on the basis of the effect of a failure
upon operation of the redundant network.
3. As a general rule, the classification of failure modes conforms to the
following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
Open part or circuit
Short part or circuit
Degradation of circuit(s), less than required
for normal performance
Output voltage stuck high
Output voltage stuck low
Low power
Excessive wear
Outputs above or below limits
Temperature rise/overheating
The assignment of failure modes was developed to conform with the normally accepted
failure modes of the item under evaluation; e.g., capacitors typically fail open or shorted, most
semiconductors can be either an open or short failure, digital circuits usually get stuck high or low.
6.3 Indentured Levels Analyzed
The indentured level analyzed is the component level. The components of the AMSU-A
instrument are the Electronics Subsystem, Receiver Subsystem, and the Antenna Subsystem. Within these
subsystems are two functionally partitioned modules identified as AMSU-A1 and AMSU-A2 (identified as
10
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A1andA2herein). Thedefinitionand functional description of these components is provided in Section 7.0
herein. This FMEA identifies potential failure modes for interfaces between these components and the
interface from modules A1 and A2 to the spacecraft. Cause of potential failures is identified to the failed
part. As identified for this FMEA, parts of the components are listed at the level shown in the Reliability
Block Diagrams (see paragraph 7.4 herein).
Table III provides descriptions for the Electronic Subsystem parts (CCA) that are the
interface between the spacecraft and all active functions of the AMSU-A instruments.
Table III Description of Subsystem Parts
Assembly Schematic Title Description
Dwg. Number Number
1338421 1338423 Temperature Sensor Board A Conditions temperature signal for input to
1331682 1331683 Temperature Sensor Board B Multiplexer
1331668 1331689 Temperature Sensor, Analog Mux Combines temperature signals in a multiplexer
1356413 1356414 Central Processing Unit Uses microprocessor to control whole system
1331126 1331127 Memory Contains ROM
1331129 1331130 Scan Control Interface Provides timing, control, and address signal
1331135 1331136 Timing and Control Interface between CPU and antenna
1356418 1356419 Analog Multiplexer and A/D Converter Multiplexes radiometric channels and
temperature sensor data and quantizes the
analog data to 15 bits
1338424 1338426 Integrate and Dump Filter Provides the final post-detection filter for the
radiometric channels
1331694 1331695 Motor Driver, 3 Hall Sensor
1331697 1331698 Interface Converter
Drives antenna motors
Performs digital logic functions and digital to
analog conversions
1334972 1334974 Resolver Data Isolator Isolates resolver data to digital processor
1337739 1337737 R/D Converter-Oscillator Converts analog resolver signals to digital signals
and produces 1600 Hz for resolver
1331157 1331158 Video Preamplifier, 3-Channel Amplifies output of detector
Amplifies output of detector1331074 1331075 Video Preamplifier, 2-Channel
M ETSAT Only
1331150 1331151 Parallel to Serial Converter Converts format from parallel to serial
1331144 1331145 Spacecraft Interface #1 Provides all communication between spacecraft
and instrument
1331148 1331148 Spacecraft Interface #2 Provides all communication between spacecraft
and instrument
1356911 1356912 Relay Ddver/Current Monitor Relay driver and motor current monitoring circuits
1356969 1356908 Power Relay and Housekeeping Power relays and voltage dividers
EOS Only
1356000 1355999 Mux Relay Control Multiplexes engineering data and provides control
signals to drive relays for scan power and PLO
switching
1355998 1355997 MIL-STD-1553 Interface Provides all communication between spacecraft
and instrument
1356760 1356001 Power Control/Monitor and Monitoring Distributes power and provides bus selection
Assy. relays, and voltage dividers for monitoring
voltages
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Section 7
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF METSAT/EOS AMSU-A INSTRUMENTS
The AMSU-A instrument is a multichannel radiometer that will be used for measuring
global atmospheric temperature profiles.
The AMSU-A instrument is a line-scan microwave sensor designed to measure scene
radiance in 15 channels to permit the calculation of the vertical temperature profile from the surface of the
Earth to approximately the 3 millibar pressure height.
The ability of passive microwave sensors to operate in the presence of clouds is the essence
of their effectiveness and has led to their development for this AMSU-A instrument.
7.1 AMSU-A1 and AMSU-A2 Modules
The AMSU-A instrument is implemented in two separate modules, AMSU-A1 and AMSU-
A2. The two lowest frequencies (Channels 1 and 2) are placed into the AMSU-A2. The antenna for AMSU-
A2 is much larger, about 12 inches in width; whereas AMSU-A1 uses two smaller antennas, each about 5
inches in width, for Channels 3 through 15.
The basic operation of these two modules is very similar. They use the same approach and
techniques to perform their function. Each of these two modules shares many of the same subassemblies,
circuit card assemblies, and other items.
Each module is configured in the same fashion, and consists of three major subsystems: (a)
antenna subsystem, (b) receiver subsystem, and (c) electronics subsystem. In each module, the basic design
of each subsystem is the same, differing only as a result of the specific frequencies.
In the 13-channel module, identified as AMSU-A1, two separate and independent antenna,
receiver, and electronic subsystems are integrated into a single common mechanical/structural and thermal
subassembly.
7.1.1 Receiver Subsystem
7.1.1.1 Subsystem Description
The AMSU-A1 Receiver Subsystem is composed of the functional receiver elements and the
structural members, called the receiver shelves, required to support the receiver elements and interface to
the AMSU-A instrument structure.
The AMSU- 1 A1 and AMSU-A2 Receiver Subassemblies are shown in block diagram fo_rm in
Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The Receiver Subsystem processes fifteen microwave channels. These
channels are distributed amongst the receiver shelves as follows:
AI-1 Receiver Shelf
A1-2 Receiver Shelf
A2 Receiver Shelf
Channels 6, 7, and 9 through 15
Channels 3, 4, 5, and 8
Channels 1 and 2
12
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Figure 2 AMSU A2 Receiver Functional Block Diagram
7.1.1.2 Subsystem Interface Definition
The Receiver Subsystem functional interfaces are as follows:
Microwave signal inputs from the Antenna Subsystem connect directly to the antenna
multiplexer output ports via waveguide flange connections.
Voltage inputs from the Power Distribution Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem connect
via electrical connectors on each receiver shelf.
Outnuts
IF attenuator signal outputs from each channel connect via semirigid coaxial connectors to
the Signal Processing Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem.
Temperature sensors and diagnostic sensors connect via electrical connectors on each
receiver shelf to the Signal Processing Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem.
7.1.2 Electronics Subsystem
7.1.2.1 Subsystem Description
p
The Electronics Subsystem is composed of the electronic elements necessary to provide
power, control, commands, data handling, and the electrical interface with the
METSAT and EOS spacecraft for the AMSU-A instrument.
The AMSU-A1 and AMSU-A2 Electronic Subassemblies are shown in block diagram form in
Figures 3 through 6. Figures 3 and 4 show the METSAT and EOS AMSU-A1 Electronics Subassemblies
respectively. Figures 5 and 6 show the METSAT and EOS AMSU-A2 Electronics Subassemblies,
respectively.
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Figure 3 METSAT AMSU A1 Electronics Subassembly
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Figure 4 EOS AMSU-A1 Electronics Subassembly
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Figure 5 METSAT AMSU-2 Electronics Subassembly
17
Report 10378A
March 1996
0_
E
0_
<
o
I Chan 1
I lnl
A2 Signal Processor Assembly
A2 Video Processor
Detector & "llntegrator I Multiplexer &
Filter IA/D Converter A2 Digital
Pulses Processor
&
Spacecraft
Interface
PositiogData
I
GSE Commands
MIL-STD-1553 i_
Interface
=l
Power
Relay
Control &
Current
Monitor
1553 Bus A .._
A2
Engineering
Data
Processor
_Receiver Power
A2 Scan Drive
Electronics
DC/DC Conv
A2-1 & A2-2 Antenna Assemblies
Status
Switched
+28V Pulse
I
+5V, +15V I
Proc Power
I
II
Power Control
II
I Switched+28V Main
I Bus
I DC/DC
Converter
Voltage
I Monitoring SurvHeater
Bus A
I Survival Heater Power
&..
Quiet Bus
&..
Bus Relay
Status
L w A2 Power Assembly_ u
Bus B
296-3043pc
Figure 6 EOS AMSU-A2 Electronics Subassembly
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The Signal Processing Assemblies provide video processing of input intermediate frequency
(IF) signals, digital processing of the resulting data stream, general control and synchronization of
instrument activities, passive analog telemetry circuits and output, scan drive electronics to control
antenna position and scan, and data interface control with the METSAT/EOS spacecraft. Each video
processor shall provide IF detection, linear preamplification, integration, multiplexing, and digitizing of
input signals. The A1 Signal Processing Assembly processes outputs from channels 3 through 15 of the A1
Receiver Subsystem while the A2 Signal Processing Assembly processes outputs channels 1 and 2 of the A2
Receiver Subsystem. Each digital processor provides processor outputs from channels 1 and 2 of the A2
Receiver Subsystem. Each digital processor provides overall control of module operation, receiving
commands from the spacecraft and formatting and sending data and status signals, generating timing
signals, and providing timing and control signals to and receiving position data from the scan drive
electronics. The scan drive electronics converts digital scan control signals to analog motor drive voltages
and digitizes antenna resolver output data. Analog circuitry is provided to allow temperature, current, and
voltage monitoring of critical instrument elements.
The Power Distribution Assembhes provide distribution and switching of primary spacecraft
power to the module subsystems and DC/DC converters in various required operational modes, and a power
return and grounding scheme in accordance with METSAT/EOS AMSU-A requirements. The Power
Distribution Assemblies also provide distribution and return of the secondary power outputs generated by
the DCfDC converters.
7.1.2.2 Subsystem Interface Definition
The Electronics Subsystem functional interface is as follows:
Innuts from Receiver Subsystem
IF attenuator signal outputs from each receiver channel connect via semirigid coaxial
connectors to the video processing electronics of the Signal Processing Assemblies.
Temperature sensors and diagnostic sensors connect via electrical connectors from each
receiver shelf to the Signal Processing Assembhes.
Im)uts from Antenna Subsystem
Motor commutation signals from the hall effect sensors mounted on each motor assembly
connect via electrical connectors from each Antenna Subassembly to the scan drive
electronics of the Signal Processing Assembhes.
Resolver analog position signals connect via electrical connectors from each Antenna
Subassembly to the scan drive electronics of the Signal Processing Assemblies.
Temperature sensors connect via electrical connectors from critical antenna components to
the temperature conditioning electronics of the Signal Processing Assemblies.
Outputs to Receiver Subsystem
Voltages from the Power Distribution Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem connect via
electrical connectors to power each receiver shelf.
PLO relay drive signal from the Relay Control and Current Monitor electronics connect via
electrical connector to the Receiver Subsystem.
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Survival Heater power passes from the spacecraft to the survival heaters located on each
receiver shelf. The Electronics Subsystem has no control over the Survival Heater Bus.
Outouts to Antenna Subsystem
Motor drive signals from the scan drive electronics connect via electrical connectors to move
each motor in the Antenna Subsystem.
Resolver drive signals from the scan drive electronics connect via electrical connectors to
each resolver in the Antenna Subsystem.
7.1.3 Antenna Subsystem
7.1.3.1 Antenna Subsystem Description
The AMSU-A Antenna Subsystem is composed of the functional antenna elements, the
antenna scan drive motors, the antenna position resolvers, the warm load calibration sources, momentum
compensator (METSAT A2 only), and the machined structural housings required to support and align the
antenna elements and to mount other elements of AMSU-A.
The A1 and A2 Antenna Subassemblies are shown in block diagram form in Figures 7 and 8
respectively.
7.1.3.2 Subsystem Interface Description
The Antenna Subsystem functional interface is as follows:
InDutS
Each reflector collects and focuses microwave radiation into its corresponding feedhorn.
Motor drive signals from the Signal Processing Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem
connects via electrical connector on each antenna subassembly.
Resolver drive signals from the Signal Processing Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem
connect via electrical connector on each antenna subassembly.
Outout_
Microwave output signals are provided from the multiplexers (or diplexer) to the
corresponding Receiver subsystem channel via waveguide connection.
Motor hall effect sensors connect via electrical connectors to the Signal Processing Assembly
of the Electronics Subsystem.
Resolver position analog signals connect via electrical connectors to the Signal Processing
Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem.
Temperature sensors in the warm calibration load and on other components connect via
electrical connectors to the Signal Processing Assembly of the Electronics Subsystem.
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7.2 AMSU-A Functional Description for the EOS Instrument
7.2.1 Antenna Functions
The cross-track scanning of the Earth scene is accomplished in a stepped fashion with a
dwell of 165 msec for AMSU-A1 and 158 msec for AMSU-A2 at each of the 30 Earth-viewing angles, and a
dwell of 330-ms for AMSU-A1 and 316-ms for AMSU-A2 at the cold and warm calibration angles. Scanning
of the antenna is accomplished in a rapid-step fashion. A complete rotation of the antenna is accomplished
in 8 seconds. During each rotation of the AMSU-A antennas, the AMSU-A modules are calibrated with a
cold reference by a view of the 3 K cosmic background radiation and a warm reference by a view of a target
at a nominal 300 K temperature.
The antenna assembly is rotated using brushless DC torque motors with precision duplex
ball bearing sets. The motors use brushless resolvers for position indication.
Each antenna subassembly is configured with a shrouded parabolic reflector assembly that
feeds a wideband corrugated conical horn to provide a symmetrical beam and high beam efficiency. A
closed path calibration system provides a completely shrouded path to the calibration target that eliminates
extraneous signals.
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7.2.2 Receiver Functions
Within the electronics subassembly are the radiometer receiver and the signal processor. To
maximize the system temperature sensitivity, each receiver is a total power, superheterodyne configuration
that uses either a dielectric resonator oscillator (DRO), phase-locked oscillator (PLO), or Gunn diode
oscillator (GDO).
The mixers, in conjunction with the local oscillators, down convert the incoming radio
frequencies (RF) at the antenna to intermediate frequencies (IF). Predetection gain and passband
characteristics are achieved by IF amplifiers and the bandpass filters. Channel center frequency
stabilization is provided by highly stable LO. A PLO which is referenced to the harmonic of a crystal
oscillator provides the frequency stability required in Channels 9 through 14.
The gain of the IF amplifiers is selected to provide an optimum power level for the square-
law detectors. Symmetric passbands for Channels 11 through 14 are established in the MHz frequency
region to generate the identical RF signal spectra. The dual-summed surface acoustic wave (SAW) filters
provide a _f2 sensitivity improvement in these channels. The SAW filters provide sharp skirts and
required center frequency stability. The square-law detectors convert receiver output power to a dc current
equivalent of brightness temperature.
7.2.3 Data Processing - Multiplexing Functions
From square-law detector outputs, processor subsystems provide radiometric temperature,
thermometric temperature, and housekeeping data to the spacecraft system; the subsystems also provide
command processing and control timing for all periodic functions of the instruments.
DC video amplifiers amplify low-level detector signals to levels sufficient for subsequent
processing. Video amplifiers are contained in shielded enclosures along with the square-law detectors.
Following video amplification, an offset voltage is added to obtain placement of the system transfer
characteristic at the desired position within the range of the A/D converter. The integrate-and-dump (I&D)
filters integrate video signals during each beam dwell period (165 ms for A1, 158 ms for A2), hold the
integrated levels during digitization, and dump to zero prior to the next beam dwell period. Brightness
temperature isolation between scene stations is provided by resetting the filters.
A 16-bit A/D converter digitizes all scene, calibration, and instrument thermometric
temperatures for eventual serial readout to the spacecraft. Inputs to the A/D converter are selected by the
analog multiplexers, controlled by a microcomputer. During scene and calibration periods, multiplexers
switch to I&D filter outputs. Between calibration periods, the multiplexer switches to platinum resistance
thermister (PRT) voltages.
The AfD converter digitizes I&D filter outputs during hold intervals and PRT voltages
between calibration periods. The microcomputer sequentially transfers data from the A/D converter to the
spacecraft.
The A/D converter range accommodates long-term channel gain variations and the
resolution provides digitization noise components within system AT budgets.
7.2.4 Temperature Monitoring
Thermometric temperatures of microwave components and other critical AMSU-A items are
provided by precision PRT sensors and calibrated conditioning circuits. Conditioned PRT voltages are
digitized and read out to the spacecraft along with radiometric temperature data.
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7.2.5 Central Processing Unit (CPU) and Control (Microcomputer)
All processing, clock, command, and telemetry functions of the AMSU.A are controlled
within the signal processing section of the electronic subassembly by a space-qualified, radiation-hardened
microprocessor.
The digital processor consists of microprocessor-based circuits for data control, frame
timing, and reflector interface control.
By means of address and data busses, the microprocessor controls all data operations within
the radiometer processing subsystem. During the scene segment of each reflector scan, digitized scene ra-
diometric temperature data of Channels 3 through 15 in the A1 module, Channels 1 and 2 in the A2
module, and antenna position data are processed by the microcomputer. The microcomputer consists of five
circuit card assemblies (CCA): (1) CPU, (2) memory, (3) scan control, (4) timing control generation (TCG),
(5) MIL-STD-1553 interface. A description of these CCA is provided in Table III. In processing instrument
data, the CPU, through the TCG, commands the analog MUX. This converts parallel analog data into a
serial stream for conversion to digital format by the A/D converter. The digital data are sent back to the
TCG which transfers them to the microprocessor data bus. The CPU routes the data to the MIL-STD-1553
interface where two successive frames are stored in first in, first out (FIFO) memory and random access
memory (RAM). The spacecraft can extract the data from the RAM asynchronously.
To control the antenna, the CPU gets position data from the memory and routes a position
command through the scan control latch in the motor circuit(s). A strobe signal from the TCG transfers the
position data to a digital comparator where digitized resolver position data subtracted from it. The
difference signal (the position error) is converted into analog form and drives the motor to the new position.
The microprocessor and other complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) logic
except for the MIL-STD-1553 interface microcircuit operates from +5 Vdc to minimize power consumption,
and has response sufficient to complete all data control requirements with considerable time margin. The
MIL-STD- 1553 microcircuit uses both +5 Vdc and - 15 Vdc.
7.2.6 Clock and Command
The analog multiplexer input selection, integrate, hold, and dump intervals, and digitization
and reflector stepping functions are controlled by the microcomputer. The CPU operates from an internally
generated clock pulse of 1.248 MHz. The DC/DC converter is synchronized to this frequency.
An 8-second pulse provided by the spacecraft via the MIL-STD-1553 bus initiates each scan
cycle. Circuits on the MIL-STD-1553 interface CCA extract these data and supply them to the CPU.
Since Channels 9 through 14 of the AMSU-A1 unit use a phase locked oscillator (PLC¢) with
a redundancy; a command is available to select the redundancy to be used. Two scanner power commands
independently control power to the AMSU-A1 scan subsystems. The AMSU-A2 scan subsystem also has a
commanded power input.
The precise position of the reflector during cold calibration (i.e. when it is staring into cold
space) is also controllable. Four discrete calibration positions are available by setting two command bits
high or low.
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7.2.7 Test Points and Telemetry
The EOS/AMSU.A instrument provides test points and analog telemetry outputs. The
analog multiplexer inputs and the A/D converter analog input are resistor-buffered and brought out to a
test connector to aid in troubleshooting. Analog telemetry (engineering data) provides analogs of supply
voltages, bus currents, and temperatures. Digital engineering data include instrument mode, scan power
and PLO power relay status, PLO lock status, and A/D converter latchup indicator. These data are
multiplexed once per scan, and output on the MIL-STD-1553 interface.
7.2.8 Temperature Monitoring
Twelve resistor temperature sensor networks on AMSU-A1, and six on AMSU-A2, input to
the spacecraft the passive analog telemetry to provide temperature data independent of instrument
operational status. Power bus redundancy monitor outputs are also provided to the spacecraft passive
analog interface.
7.2.9 Input Filter, DC/DC Converter, and Relay Control
From the redundant +28-volt spacecraft quiet power bus, AMSU-A power systems provide
regulated voltages to receiver and radiometer processor subsystems. Redundant reflector scanning motors
operate from the +28-volt noisy power bus.
Power on/off control is not provided by the AMSU-A modules; switching between the bus
redundancies is automatically performed by relay circuits in the instrument.
A single DC/DC converter in each unit provides receiver and radiometer processor voltages
isolated from the +28-volt bus. The DC/DC converter is synchronized to the 1.248 MHz CPU clock. The
DC/DC converter provides regulated output of +15 volts, -15 volts, +8 volts, +5 volts, and +10 volts. The
mixer/IF amplifiers share a common +10-volt output. A common +8-volt output supplies receiver IF
amplifier power. +15 V outputs supply power to video amplifiers and other analog circuitry of the
radiometer processor. The +5-volt output is utilized for the data processing functions of the radiometer
processor subsystem. Additional isolated +15 V and +5V supplies are provided for the scan drive
subsystem. The PLO on AMSU-A1 also has independent + 15 V supplies.
In the absence of the clock signal, the converter will run asynchronously. Input diodes
protect the converter from polarity reversal damage. DC/DC converter output voltage regulation is
maintained for main power bus input voltages of +24 to +35 volts. Above +40 volts, the converter will shut
down.
Scan motors operate from the noisy +28-volt bus. Power to the scan motors is controlled by
means of latching relays controlled by the scanner power command.
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7.3 Description of METSAT/EOS Unique Functions Hardware
The major differences between METSAT and EOS AMSU-A instruments are the Power
Interfaces and Signal Interfaces with the spacecraft. As shown in Figure 9 the EOS power interface has
been improved to take advantage of the spacecraft "quiet" 28 volt supply bus. The "quiet" bus reduces
instrument internal noise generation and improved producibility and "safe-to-mate" capability. To
implement the power interface improvement required a change in the METSAT power relay and
housekeeping circuit card assembly, thus creating a power control and monitoring circuit card assembly for
the EOS instrument. The new EOS power control and monitoring circuit card assembly has automatic
input power sense and select functions. As shown in Figure 10, the EOS signal interface compared to
METSAT has been changed to take advantage of the spacecraft MIL-STD-1553 data bus interface and
elimination of the external 1.248 MHz clock interface. This change deleted the METSAT spacecraft
interface circuit card assemblies from the EOS design and replaced them with a MIL-STD-1553 interface
circuit card assembly.
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Figure 9 Power Interface Differences
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7.4 Reliability Block Diagram
The following figures show the rehabili W block diagram for the METSAT and EOS AMSU-A
instruments. The block diagram is partitioned functionally as the A1 Module (Figure 10) and the A2
Module (Figure 11). Next, the block diagram is partitioned into the Antenna Subsystem, Receiver
Subsystem, and Electronics Subsystem*. A functional description of each partition is provided in Section
6.0 herein, and this description further points out the functional differences between the METSAT and EOS
instruments.
METSAT Top View Reliability Block Diagram
H  eoeiverH HSubsystem Subsystem Subsystem
1 = 2.6360 t = 6.2687 2,.= 3.8350
Software
1 = 0.75
METSAT Z = 13.4897
EOS Top View Reliability Block Diagram
Subsystem Subsystem Subsystem Software
= 2.2754 t = 6.2687 _ = 3.8618 _ = 0.75
EOS ;L= 13.1559 396-3025M
Figure 11 Top View, AMSU-A Subsystems, Reliability Block Diagram
" Functional differences between METSAT and EOS are located in the Electronic Subsystem and a separate block
diagram is provided for the METSAT and EOS Electronic Subsystems. In the Antenna Subsystem there is a
compensation assembly shown on the METSAT/EOS block diagram and it is identified as METSAT only.
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Figure 12 Top View, AMSU-A Module A1 and A2 Reliability Block Diagram
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Figure 13 Module A1, Antenna Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliability Block Diagram
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;L= 0.00761 X= 0.1923
1331559-2 1331516-X 3 Pair
A371 I A381I /Bandpass I I ,= _. .... ,,,r I I RF Cable
t
Filter H .............. H "
(10-200 MHz) Connecto,o
_. _ X = 0.0381 X = 0.0114 ;L= 0.009 ....
Channel 7 Receiver Elements
t
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 1356680-5 1336610.7 1331509-5 1331562-17 I
n n m
I A30 A39 A31 I
I Isolator 54.94 GHz Waveguide MixedlF I
I DRO Attenuator Amplifier I
I I
I _, = 0.0114 X = 0.0260 _, = 0.00761 Z = 0.1923 I
IIIII_ 1331559"2( Bandpass0-200FilterMHz)A32 Ht331516-X nIF AttenuatorA33 ConnectorsRF Cable3Paii _-IiI I
I I
I X= 0.0381 Z = 0.0114 X = 0.009 I
396-3013 M
®
Figure 14 Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliability Block Diagram
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1
1336610-10 1331509-9 1331562-20 I
H "H H "h'89.0 GHz Waveguide Mixer/IF IDRO Attenuator Amplifier II
_,= 0.1213 _ = 0.00761 _ = 0.1923 II
r'_mmmm_m
I 1356680-8
I
I A24
Isolator
I
I
I _,= 0.0114
II _1331559-1 A26 _i331516-X ___A28 3Pair II
I Bandpass I
I Filter IF Attenuator RF Cable I
I (5o0-115o0 MHz) Connectors I
I I
I ;L= 0.0381 Z= 0.0114 _ = 0.009 I
L -J
Receiver Channels 9-14 Common Elements
r
;'Redundant PLO Assembly 1331509-8 ;'M39016/35-006 1, 1348360
"1
I
I
I
I
!
I
__[
I
I
1356680-7
A40
Isolator
_,= 0.0114
' Z,= 0.0131
I
I
I
' 1331554
I
" Hybrid Tee
I =
t Waveguide
Attenuator I: I A65
PLO Power lil PhaoS;]_:::ed
On/Off Relay [_ (57.290344 GHz)
I
1331509-7 I
I
Waveguide II PLO Power
Attenuator On/Off Relay
I g
m_u_ ......
1348360i "tPhase-LockedOscillator
(57.290344 GHz)
1331510-1 (METSAT)
1331508-1 (EOS)
__ Waveguide
Attenuator
_,= 0.00761
1331562-19 1356669-1
A31 t_ A42
Mixer/I F 3 - Way
Amplifier Power
Divider
= 0.2125 _,= 0.53649
Receiver Channel 9
"1
1331579-9 1331559-4 1331516-X 3 Pair I
"8H"H "°H BIF Amplifier Bandpass IF Attenuator RF CableFilter Connectors
_.= 0.0731 _.= 0.0381 Z = 0.0114 _.= 0.009 I
Figure 14
396-3014M
Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSATfEOS Reliability Block Diagram
(Continued)
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I
I
I
I
I
1331579-9 1331559-7 1331516-X
"H °HIF Amplifier Bandpass IF AttenuatorFilter RF CableConnectors
Z = 0.0731 _ = 0.0381 _. = 0.0114 _, = 0.009
3 Pair I
Receiver Channels 11-14 Common Elements
1
I 1331579-7 1356670 I
II| IF Amplifier 4-Way Power II Divider I
I I
I 2_= 0.007184 Z = 0.53649 I
J
/
lReceiver Channel 11 11331516-X 3 Pair IU "UIF Attenuator RF CableConnectors
I
11331576-1 1331579:10
I _. -- 0.25988 Z = 0.17534 _.= 0.0114 _.= 0.009
L
Rec__eiver Channel 12
1331576-2 1331579-11 1331516-X
='I
3 Pair I
"H "H "HSAW Filter IF Amplifier IF Attenuator RF CableConnectors
;L = 0.25988 Z = 0.1808 _, = 0.0114 _, = 0.009
Rece iv er C_han_nel 13
I I 1331576-3
III "Hi1_ SAW Filter
1331579-12 1331516-X 3 Pair
"H "H kIF Amplifier IF Attenuator RF CableConnectors
I Z = 0.25988 _ = 0.1700 _, = 0.0114 _, = 0.009
396-3015M
Figure 14 Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliability Block Diagram
(Continued)
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lReceiver Channel 14
I
I 1331576-4 1331579-13 1331516-x ,Ft1 SAW Filter IF Amplifier
I 2`=0.25988 _.= 0.20010 2 =` 0.0114
I_
Report 10378A
March 1996
A62
IF Attenuator
3 Pair
RF Cable
Connectors h
2`= 0.009
I
Common Elements, Receiver Assembly, AI-2 (PIO 1356409-1)
1337640-3 2 req'd 1337651-1 2 req'd AS8381-04-F04NA 311P409-1P-B-12 AS8381-044-D04NA
"_ Therm°f°'l fi Therm°static H C°nnect°r _ C°nnect°r _ C°nnect°r _1Heater Switch2`= 3.4E-6 2`= 0.00026 2,= 0.005 2`= 0.005 2`= 0.005I
Figure 14
Receiver Channel 3
I 1356680-1 1331509-1 1336610-3
I
r H HI Isolator Waveguide 50.3 GHzAttenuator DRO
2`= 0.0114 2`= 0.0076 2`= 0.0260
I 1331562-13 1331559-3 1331516-X
LJ Mixer/IF IF Bandpass IF
Amplifier Filter Attenuator
_.= 0.19230 2 =` 0.0381 2`= 0.0114
3 Pair
H RF Cable _
Connectors
2`= 0.009
mmlmm m= l_m_m_mmmm--mmm_mmm_m
Receiver Channel 4
r
I 1356680-2
'1II Isolator
t=
2`= 0.0114
1331562-14
1331509-2 1336610-4
Waveguide Oscillator
Attenuator (52.8 GHz)
2 =` 0.0076 2 =` 0.0260
1331559-2 1331516-X 3 Pair
Mixer/IF _ IF Bandpass H IF H _FO._,eAmplifier Filter Attenuator Connectors
2`= 0.19230 2`= 0.0381 2`= 0.0114 2`= 0.009
I
I
I
I
.=,1
396-3016M
Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSATfEOS Reliability Block Diagram
(Continued)
®
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Receiver Channel 5
1356680-3 1331509-3 1336610-5I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
L
Isolator H Waveguide
Attenuator
X = 0.0114
_,= 0.0076
H 53.956GHz
DRO
Z = 0.0260
I 1331562-15 1331559-5 _1331516.X
Mixer/iF IF IFUFilter AttenuatorAmplifier Bandpass
2,= 0.19230 _,= 0.0381 Z = 0.0114
3 Pair
H RF Cable
Connectors
Z = 0.009
B
Receiver Channel 8
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
,,..11
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
IL
1356680-6 1331509-6 1336610-8
Isolator
H Waveguide F 55.5 GHz
Attenuator DRO
Z = 0.0114 ;L= 0.0076 Z = 0.0260
111HH Mixer/IF IF IFFilter Attenuator
Amplifier Bandpass
Z = 0.19230 X= 0.0381 _,= 0.0114 Z = 0.009
3 Pair
RF Cable
Connectors
Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSAT/EOS 2, = 5.6318
396-3017M
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Figure 14 Module A1, Receiver Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliability Block Diagram
(Continued)
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1331610-1 1356760-1 1356010-1 1356428-1
Detect°r/ H P°wer C°ntr°l/ _-_ DC-t°-DC H Cable Assy'Preamp Monitoring WlAssembly Assembly Converter SpacecraftPower
_,= 0.24994 _,= 0.28827 k = 0.38243 _, = 0.04015
h
Cable Assy, Cable Assy, Cable Assy, Cable Assy,
W2 W3 W4 W5
Power In Scan Drive Clock & PRT Warm Load
_, = 0.08909 _,= 0.11464 _,= 0.09264 _,= 0.24649
396-3018M
EOS
Figure 15 Module A1, Electronics Subsystem, EOS Reliability Block Diagram
36
Report 10378A
March 1996
Signal Processing Assembly (1356412-1)
I 1338421 1331682 2 req'd 1331688
I Temp Sensor i Temp Sensor I I Temp Sensor
'A' CCA 'B' CCA !--I Analog Mux
(Not mission cdtJc Dii CCA
_. = 0.03278 _ = N/A _,= 0.00914
1355998 1331135
__] MIL-STD-1553 H Timing and H
Interface CCA Control CCA
1356418 1338424 4 req'd
H AnalegMux& _ Integrate& h
A/D Converter Dump Filter
CCA CCA
= 0.03684 ;L= 0.05076
1356413 1331126
CPU CCA
Memory CCA
Z = 0.15342 Z = 0.02884 Z = 0.02334 Z = 0.01542
_! Drive CCA's
 can
,, 1331129 1356000
Scan Control H
Interface CCA
1331697 2 req'd 1334972 2 req'd
Interface/ H
Converter CCA
MUXccARelay H
Resolver-Data
Isolator CCA
_,= 0.00731 _ = 0.02586 _.= 0.06984 ;L= 0.03432
_1337739 2 req'd 2 req'd
1331694
R-D H
Converter/ Motor Driver
| Oscillator CCA
CCA
Z = 0.16664 _. = 0.07728
=.,.=I i ,iI
Module A1, Electronics Subsystem, EOS ;L = 2.2354
396-3019M
Figure 15 Module A1, Electronics Subsystem, EOS Reliability Block Diagram (Continued)
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1331610-1
METSAT
X = 0.24994
1357146-1
Detector/
Preamp
Assembly
1356969-1 1356010-1 1356428-2
Housekeeping Converter Wl
Assembly Assembly SpacecraftPower
Z, = 0.08324 _ = 0.38243 Z,= 0.04015
1356941-1 1356942-1 1356943-1
W2 Cable Assy, Cable Assy, Cable Assy,
W3 W4 W5
I/O Interface Scan Drive I/O Interface I/O Temp
Power
_, = 0.08909 Z,= 0.10757 _, = 0.19645 _, = 0.25041
396-3022M
-@
METSAT
Figure 16 Module A1, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT Reliability Block Diagram
38
Report 10378A
March 1996
Signal Processing Assembly (1331670-7)
I
I
I
@I
METSAT I
1338421 1331682-1 2 req'd 1331688 1356418
TempSens°r _ II TempSens°r I I TempSens°r n Anal°g Mux&
'A' CCA I 'B' CCA I--I Analog Mux ND Converter
CCA CCA
I(Notmissioncdtical)l I
Z = 0.03278 _,= N/A k = 0.00914 _,= 0.03684
_1338424 4 req'd_331144 _331147 H1331150
Parallel to
Integrate & Spacecraft Spacecraft Serial
Dump Filter Interface Interface Converter
CCA No.1 No.2
k = 0.05076 ;k= 0.08345 _.= 0.05416 _,= 0.06697
1331135 1356413 1331126
t-] Timing and n CPU CCA H Memory CCA hControl CCA
Z = 0.02884 k = 0.02334 _.= 0.01542
', Scan Drive CCA's
== 1331129 1356911-1 1331697 2 req'd 1334972 2 req'd
n Relay Driver& n Interface/ Iq
Scan Control Current Monitor Converter CCA Resolver-Data
Interface CCA Isolator CCA
CCA
_,= 0.00731 _, = 0.06183 ;L= 0.06984 Z = 0.03432
h1337739 2 req'd
c°nR-eDer/ nOscillator
CCA
1331694-1 2 req'd
Motor Driver
CCA
_,= 0.16664 ;L= 0.07728
Upper CardCage
Module AI, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT _ = 2.2172
396-3021M
Figure 16 Module A1, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT Reliability Block Diagram (Continued)
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Antenna Assembly (1331210-2)
I 1333650-1 1331231-1
Reflector
Drive
Assembly
I X = 0.36703
Feedhorn
1331235-1
H A30
Calibration
Source
And PRTs
_,= 0.001 _,= 0.008
1331084-1
Diplexer
= 0.38243
1333660-1
_ Compensation
Assembly
(METSAT Only)
_,= 0.3606
Module A2 Antenna Subsystem MESTAT, _. = 1.11906
EOS, Z = 0.75846
396-3007M
Figure 17 Module A2, Antenna Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliaiblity Block Diagram
4O
Common Receiver Elements
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I
I
1337640-3 2 req'd
Thermofoil
Heater
AS8096-15PT-0 1337651-1 2 req'd AS8381-04-F04NA
H C°nnect°r H Therm°static _- _Switch Connector
_.= 3.4E-6 Z = 0.005 _ = 0.00026 ;L= 0.005 Z = 0.005
Channel I Receiver Elements
!
I 1336610-1 i 331562-11
'1 H H HI A4 A12 A14I Isolator 23.8 GHz Waveguide Mixer/IFI DRO Attenuator Amplifier
I
I _ = 0.01142 ;_= 0.04100 Z = 0.00761 _.= 0.19230
, H 3 pairs
I
I A16 A19
I Bandpass RF CableFilter IF Attenuator Connectors
I (10-135 aHz)
I
I X= 0.03807 Z = 0.01142 ;L= 0.009
L
AS8381-04-D04NA
H Connector
I
I
I
I
1331111-2 1331100-1
Figure 18
Channel 2 Receiver Elements
r
I 1331112-2 1336610-2 1331100-2 1331562-12
I A5 A13 A15
I Isolator 31.4 GHz Waveguide Mixer/IF
! DRO Attenuator Amplifier
I
I _,= 0.01142 X= 0.04100 _ = 0.00761 ;L= 0.19230
I 1331559-3 1331516-X 3 pairs
I
I
I
I
I
L
Bandpass
Filter IF Attenuator
(10-90 MHz)
RF Cable
Connectors
;L= 0.03807 _ = 0.01142 Z = 0.009
I
I
I
I
i,i
Module A2, Receiver Subsystem, METSATIEOS Z = 0.6369
396-3008M
Module A2, Receiver Subsystem, METSAT/EOS Reliability Block Diagram
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®
EOS
1356760-1 1336010-1 1331300-1
A25 H A27 H A21
Power Control/ DC-to-DC Detector/
Monitoring
Assembly Converter Preamp
t = 0.28827 _, = 0.38243 t = 0.04339
1356431-1
Spacecraft
Power
1 = 0.04440
I 1356432-1
I Cable Assy,
_] PoweW2rin
= 0.08274
I 1356817-1
ExtCeab'd_r
| w6
1 = 0.00204
1356433-1 1356434-1
Scan Drive Clock & PRT
= 0.06038 _,= 0.06382
1356816-1
H Cable Assy,
W5
Warm Load
2_= 0.12961
1356818-1 1356819-1
H Cable H Cable
Extender Extender
W7 W8
= 0.00710 t = 0.00241
-©
EOS
396-3009M
Figure 19 Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, EOS Reliability Block Diagram
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Signal Processi ng Assembly (1356439-1)
r
I
I
EOS
1338421 1331682-1 1331688
TempSensor --LI TempSensor ' '] I TempSensor
'A' CCA t 'B' CCA I-'t Analog Mux/ I I I CCAI(Not mission critical)l I
_,= 0.03278 Z = N/A ;L= 0.00914
1356418 1338424
___ Anal°gMux& n Integrate& I
A/D Converter Dump Filter
CCA CCA
= 0.03684 Z = 0.01269
I 1355998 1331135 1356413
U MIL-STD-15553 H Timing and tt
Interface CCA Control CCA
_.= 0.15342 _ = 0.02884
_Scan Drive CCA's
CPU CCA
= 0.02334
1331126
n Memo_ CCA
Z=0.01_2
1331129 1356000 1331697 1334972
Interfacel H
Converter CCA
n Mux Relay n
CCA
Scan Control
Interface CCA
Resolver-Data
Isolator CCA
_,= 0.00731
L 1337739
conRveDer/
Oscillator
CCA
_,= 0.08332
_.= 0.02586 _.= 0.03492 _.= 0.01716
1331694-2
H Motor Driver
CCA
Z = 0.03874
Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, EOS _ = 1.62637
_'396-3023M
Figure 19 Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, EOS Reliability Block Diagram (Continued)
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1331300-1 1356969-2 1356010-1 1356431-2
METSAT
Detector/
Preamp
Assembly H "ower"e","H OC"°-OCH Ca_'e_'"'
Housekeeping Converter WlSpacecraft
Assembly Assembly Power
= 0.07009 2,.= 0.38243 2,.= 0.04440_. = 0.04339
I 1357147-1
U H| I10 Interface
Power
_. = 0.08274
Extender W6
_.= 0.00204
1356946-1 1356947-1 1356948-1
I I
CableAssy, I I CableAssy,
W4 H W5
I/O Interface I/O TempCablew3ASsy, nScan Drive
= 0.06024 Z = 0.14516 _ = 0.13367
1356818-1 1356819-1
n Cable n Cable
Extender W7 Extender W8
Z = 0.00710 Z = 0.00241
-@
METSAT
396-3020M
Figure 20 Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT Reliability Block Diagram
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Signal Processing Assembly (1331120-2)
I
I
I
©,
METSAT
1338421
TempSensor
'A'CCA
1331682-1 1331688
_l TempSensor I I TempSens°rl 'B' CCA H Analog Mux
I(Not missioncdtical)l I CCA
X= N/A X= 0.00914Z = 0.03278
' 1338424 1331144
1331147
] I Integrate& H Spacecraft _._ Spacecraft H
Dump Filter Interface Interface
I CCA No.1 No.2
1356418
H Analog Mux &
ND Converter
CCA
_,= 0.03684
1331150
Parallel to
Serial
Converter
_.= 0.01269 _.= 0.08345 X = 0.05416
I 1331135 1356413 1331126
U Timingand l- _ CPU CCA H Memory CCA _]I Control CCA
_,= 0.02884 _.= 0.02334 ;L= 0.01542
Scan Drive CCA's
_,= 0.06697
1331129 1356911-2 1331697 1334972
t H Relay Driver & H Interface/ H
Scan Control Current Monitor Converter CCA Resolver-Data
Interface CCA CCA Isolator CCA
X = 0.00731 _,= 0.06030 _,= 0.03492 _,= 0.01716
1337739
Co "ve%,
Oscillator
CCA
Z = 0.08332
Iiim Ii Ii
1331694-2 1331694-2
H Motor Driver H Motor Driver
(Comp) (Antenna)
CCA CCA
X= 0.03874 _,= 0.03874
METSAT
Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT_, = 1.6178 396-3010M
Figure 20 Module A2, Electronics Subsystem, METSAT Reliability Block Diagram (Continued)
45
Report10378A
March 1996
APPENDIX A
FMEA WORKSHEETS FOR EOS AND METSAT
AMSU-A INSTRUMENTS
NOTE: "System" blocl_ on
worksheet indicates if worksheet
applies to EOS only, METSAT
only, or EOS/METSAT. (Both
EOS and METSAT have the same
function hardware.
A-1
Section
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
APPENDIX A
Table of Contents
Subiect
Module A- 1 to Spacecraft Interface
Module A-2 to Spacecraft Interface
Electronics Subsystem Interface
Receiver Subsystem Interface
Antenna Subsystem Interface
Paffe Number
A-3
A-10
/
A-14
A-29
A-39
Report 10378A
March 1996
A-2
SectionA1
Report 10378A
March 1996
Module A1 to Spacecraft Interface
FMEA Worksheets
NOTE: "System" block on
worksheet indicates if worksheet
applies to EOS only, METSAT
only, or EOS/METSAT. (Both
EOS and METSAT have the same
function hardware.
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System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/METSAT
A1 - SiC Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
Mechanical Provides
Attachment direct base
mount
attachment of
the AMSU-A1
module to the
spacecraft
Thermal Minimize heat
Interface flow between
the A1
module and
the
spacecraft
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Separa-
tion of the
A1 module
from S/C
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
of
mounting
bolts
MODE
Exceeds
the +10°C
to +65°C
window
Failure Effects
Mission Next
Phese/Op. Higher
Mode Level
LAUNCH Possible
damage
during
launch or
staging
MISSION Degraded
sensitivity
Mission
Effects
Loss of
capability
to perform
mission
Degraded
sensitivity
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
None
during or
after
launch
House-
keeping
output
serial data
Compensating
Provisions
Responsibility of
spacecraft
contractor
Minimum reliance
on spacecraft for
heat sink
Severity
Class
III
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Occasional
A-4
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System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/ONLY
A1 - S/C Interface
See GIRDFUIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
Electrical
Interfaces
EOS/AMSU-
A1 to space-
craft
Input Power
FunoUon
Provide +28
VDC main
power, and
+28V analog
temperature
telemetry
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Short or
ovedoad
on incom-
ing +28V
primary
power
(quiet bus)
CAUSE
1. Cable
short
2. Faul_
Filter Pin
(t33171_
3. Bus
selection
circuit
shorted to
return
(1356002)
4. DC/DC
converter
shorted to
return
(1356010)
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Chance of Significant Analog
loss of de- house-
data on all gradation keeping
13 of mission telemetry
channels only if both loss of
redundan- data
cies fail
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Loss of Significant
data on all degrada-
13 tion of
channels mission
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Design inspec-
tion and test
requirements are
imposed
100% inspection
and test o|
connector lilter
pins
Designinspection
andtest
requirements are
imposed
Designinspection
and test
requirementsare
Imposed
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Remote
Extremely
Unlikely
Extremely
Unlikely
* For causes 1, 2, and 3, short at interface would result in automatic switching to redundant bus.
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System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
METSAT ONLY
A1 - SIC Interface
See GIRDFUIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
Electrical
Interfaces
EOS/AMSU-
A1 to space-
craft
a. Input
Power
Function
Provide +28
VDC main
power, +28V
pulse load
power, and
+28V analog
temperature
telemetry
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Short or
ovedoad
on incom-
ing +28V
primary
power
CAUSE
1. Cable
short
2. Faulty
Filter Pin
(1331712)
3. Turn-on
Circuit
Shorted to
return
(1331621))
4. DC/DC
converter
shorted to
return
(1356010)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of Significant
data on all degrada-
13 tion of
channels, mission
only if both
redundan-
cies fail
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Analog
house-
keeping
telemetry
loss of
data
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Design inspec-
tion and test
requirements are
Imposed
100% Inspection
and test of
connector filter
pins
Design inspection
and test
requirements are
imposed
Design inspection
and test
requirements are
Imposed
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
I Remote
I Remote
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
A-6
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System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
METSAT ONLY
A1 - SiC Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
b. Clock Input
c. Command
Input
Function
Provide
1.248 MHZ
clock for
timing all
AMSU-A
functions
Provides
+IOV
interface
power and
return in
addition to 14
level discrete
commands
for A1
Failure
: Modes &
Causes
MODE
Short
CAUSE
1. Cable
short
2. Space-
craft Inter-
face #1
Short
(1331144)
3. Space-
craft Inter-
face #2
Short
(1331147)
MODE
Short on
any
command
: signal line
CAUSE
1. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #1
(1331144)
2. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #2
(1331147)
Mlsslon
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Useless Significant System
data on all degrada- continu-
A1 tion of ously
channels mission looks at
one
channel
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Inability to Significant Erratic or
properly degrada- no output
control tion of data
operations mission
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Compensating
Provisions
Design inspec-
tion and test
requirements are
Imposed
Same as above
Same as above
Design inspec-
tion and test
requirements are
imposed
Same as above
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
I Remote
I Remote
I Remote
I Remote
II Remote
A-7
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System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
METSAT ONLY
A1 - S/C Interface
See GIRD/UIID
:!:ii!'
ID _em/
No. Funct.
ID
d. TIP
Interface
Function
Provides for
select pulse
(A 1) and shift
pulse (C1) fron
spacecraft,
digital A output
major frame
sync, and
signal return
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Short on
seriai data
CAUSE
1.Failure
in Space-
cra_lnteF
face #1
(1331144)
2. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #2
(1331147)
MODE
Open on
senal data
CAUSE
1. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #1
(1331144)
2. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #2
{1331147)
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mid.
MISSION No serial Loss of No serial
data out mission data
(stuck low)
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION No serial Same as ! Same as
data out above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Compensating Severity Failure
Provisions Class Prob.
Hi-Rel Parts and
Design, Test and
Inspection are
imposed
II Remote
Same as Same as above
above
II Remote
HI-Rel Parts and
Design, Test and
Inspection are
Imposed
Same as above
Remote
Remote
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METSA T O NLY
A1 - SIC Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
e. Digital B
Output
f. Analog
Telemetry
Output
Function
Provides for
monitoring of
command and
instrument
operational
status using 13
bi-level output_
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Short on
digital B
signal
CAUSE
1. Failure
In Space-
craft Inter-
face #1
(1331144)
2. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #2
(1331147)
MODE
Short on
any analog
telemetry
signal
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
May
provide
operational
data but
not status
Same as
above
No useful
analog
telemetry
data
No effect
Same as
above
Degraded
mission
Same as
above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Inability to
assess
operational
status data
Same as
above
Inability to
assess
analog
telemetry
data
Compensatlng
Provlslons
Hi-RelPartsand
Design, Test and
Inspe_ionare
Imposed
Same as above
Hi-Rel Parts and
Design, Test and
Inspection are
imposed
Severity
Class
III
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Remote
Remote
Provide for
analog
housekeeping
and switched
thermistor
outputs
CAUSE
1. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
face #1
(1331144)
2. Failure
in Space-
craft Inter-
lace #2
(1331147}
MISSION Same as
above
S_'ne as
above
Same as above III Remote
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EOS/METSAT
A2 - S/C Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
Mechanical
Thermal
Interface
Function
Provides
direct base
mount
attachment of
the AMSU-A2
module to the
spacecraft
Minimize heat
flow between
the A2
module and
the
spacecraft
Failure
Modes &
Causes
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
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EOS/ONLY
A2 - SIC Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
Electrical Provide +28
Interfaces to VDC main
AMSU-A2 power, and
spacecraft +28V analog
temperature
Input power telemetry
Failure Mission
Modes & Phase/Op.
Causes Mode
See
analysis
for A1
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Compensating
Provlslons
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
A-12
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METSAT ONLY
A2 - S/C Interface
See GIRD/UIID
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
Electrical
Interfaces
EOS/AMSU-
A2 to space-
craft
a. Input
Power
b. Clock Input
c. Command
Input
d. TIP
Interface
e. Digital B
Output
:f. Analog
Telemetry
' Output
Function
Provide +28
VDC main
power, +28V
pulse load
power, and
+28V analog
temperature
telemetry
Provide
1.248 MHZ
clock for
timing all
AMSU-A
functions
Provides
+ 10V
interface
power and
return in
addition to 14
level discrete
commands
for A1
Provides for
select pulse
(A1) and shift
pulse (C1) fror
spacecraft,
digital A outpul
major frame
sync, and
signal return
Provides for
monitoring of
command and
instrument
operational
status using 9
bi-level output,,
Provide for
analog
housekeeping
and switched
thermistor
outputs
Failure
Modes &
Causes
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
See
analysis
for A1
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
A-13
Section A3
Report 10378A
March 1996
Electronics Subsystem Interface
FMEA Worksheets
A-14
Report 10378A
March 1996
System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/METSAT
Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function
The
electronics
provides
radlometMc
temperature,
thermometric
temperature,
and house-
keeping data
at levels and
in a format
compatible
with the
spacecraft. It
also provides
command
processing
and control
timing for all
periodic
functions in
the module.
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Malfunc-
tion in
electrical
interfaces
to
spacecraft
CAUSE
See A1
S/C
Interface
Analyses
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
data on
any single
channel 3-
15
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents In the
respective
channel
Mission
Phese/Op.
Mode
1. Video MISSION
amplifier
offset
{1331157)
2. I&D filter MISSION
(1338424)
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of Degraded
data in a mission
single
channel
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mid.
Compensating
Provisions
Low levels High reliability
on asingle components
channel 3-
15
Same as Same as above
above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Same as
above
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EOS/ONLY
Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loss of
radio-
metric
data on all
13
channels
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents:
1. Analog
Multi-
plexer lAD
convener
(1356418)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
2. Memory MISSION
: (1331126)
MISSION! 3. Timing
control
generation
(1331135)
4. CPU
(1356413)
5. Scan
control
(1331129)
6 MIL-
STD-1553
(1355998)
7. DC/DC
Converter
( 1356010-1
Failure Effects
Next : Mission Failure
Higher I Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
No useful Significant Operation-
EOS/ degrada- ai status
AMSU-A tion of
data on mission.
the 13
channels.
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION No useful Significant Operation-
AMSU-A degrada- ai status
data on tion o!
the 13 mission
channels
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
CompensaUng Severity Failure
: Provisions Class Prob.
High reliability I Extremely
components unlikely*
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
High reliability I Extremely
components unlikely
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
* Required for performance. Procured to Aerojet specification, that requires qualification and acceptance testing including performance,
vibration, shock, acceleration, thermal cycling, and burn-in as applicable. It also includes flow down of requirements for parts, materials,
and processes control; e.g., standard parts and NHB 5300.4(3A-1)
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METSAT ONLY
Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loss of
radio-
metric
data on all
13
channels
CAUSE
Maltunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents
1. Analog
Multiplexer/
ND
Converter
(1356418)
2. Memory
3. Timing
Control
Genera-
tion)
4. CPU
(1331123)
&Scan
Control
i (1331129))
i 6. Mother
Board
(1331153)
7. Parallel
to Serial
Converter
8. Serial
spacecraft
interface
(1331147
and
133144)
9. DC/DC
converter
(1356010-1
Failure Effects
i Mission Next Mission
Phase/Op. Higher Effects
Mode Level
MISSION No useful Significant
AMSU-A de-
data on gradation
the 13 of mission
channels
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION No useful Significant
AMSU-A degrada-
data on all tion of
13 mission
channels
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as
above above
Failure Compensating
Detect. Provisions
Mtd.
Operations High reliability
status components
Same as Same as above
above
Same as Same as above
above
i Operation- High reliability
al status components
Operation- Same as above
al status
Operation- Same as above
al status
Operation- Same as above
al status
Operation- Same as above
al status
Operation- Same as above
al status
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
I Extremely
Unlikely
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EOS/METSAT
Electronics Subsystem
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Beam
position
data stuck
or erratic
CAUSE
1. Failure
in motor
control
circuitry.
2. Mal-
function or
failure in
any of the
following
compon-
ents:
Scan
control
(1331129)
Timing
control
generator
(1331135)
Command
signal
wiring
backplane
Mission
Phase/Op.
Made
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
See See See Operation-
antenna antenna antenna ai status
subsystem subsystem subsystem
analysis analysis analysis
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
In- Some
complete degrada-
data tion of
transfer, mission.
Operation-
al status
Beam
position
data not
consistent
with radio-
: metdc
data
sequence.
Same as Same as ; Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Compensating
Provisions
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
High reliability III Extremely
circuitry unlikely
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above,'-
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function Fallure
Modes &
Causes
Mode
Loss of
any serial
readout
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in:
1. MIL-
STD-1553
interface
(1355998)
2. Timing
control
generation
(1331135)
Mlsslon
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
No useful Significant
data from degrada-
channels tion of
3-15. mission.
No useful Significant
data from degrada-
channels tion of
3-15. mission.
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Telemetry
voltage
status
Telemetry
voltage
status
Compensatlng
Provisions
High reliability
circuitry
High reliability
circuitry
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Same as above Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Extremely
unlikely
I Sameas
above
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Failure
Modes &
Causes
Mode
Loss of
any serial
readout
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in:
1. Parallel
to serial
converter
(1331150))
2, Timing
Control
Genera-
tion
(1331135)
Failure Effects
Mission Next
Pha_e/Op. Higher
Mode Level
MISSION No useful
data from
channels
3-15.
MISSION No useful
data from
channels
3-15.
MISSION Same as
above
Mission Failure
Effects Detect.
Mtd.
Significant Telemetry
degrada- voltage
tion of status
mission.
Significant Telemetry
degrada- voltage
tion of status
mission.
Same as Same as
above above
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
circuitry
High reliability
circuitry
Same as above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Extremely
unlikely
Extremely
unlikely
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ID Item/
No. ! Funct.
ID
A1
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
Mode
Electrical
Inter-
mittent
CAUSE
Fracture of
printed
circuit
traces or
plated
through
hole.
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Worst Extremely Inter-
effect is no degraded mittent or
useful data mission, erratic
on output
channels data
3-15.
Compensating
Provisions
Reliable circuit
certified
processes
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
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EOS/METSAT
Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. i Funct.
liD
A2
Electronics
Function
See A1
Electronics
description
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
data on
i any single
:channel 1
&2.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents in the
respective
channel:
1. Video
;amplifier/
I offset
(1331157)
2. I&D filter
(1331676)
i 3. DC/DC
Converter
(1356010-1',
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION Loss of Degraded Low levels
data in a mission on a single
single channel 1
channel, or 2.
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION Loss of Loss of No data
Signal mission
Processing
Compensating
Provisions
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
High reliability III Remote
components
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
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Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
Failure Mission
Modes & Phase/Op.
Causes Mode
MODE
Loss of
radio-
metric
data on
both 1 & 2
channels.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents:
1. Analog
Multi-
plexer/AD
converter
(1356418)
2. Memory
(1331126)
3. Timing
control
generation
(1331135)
4. CPU
(1356413)
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
No useful
EOS/
AMSU-A
data on
the 2
channels
Same as
above
Same as
above
No useful
AMSU-A
data on
the 2
channels
Same as
above
Degraded
mission
Same as
above
Same as
above
Degraded
mission
Same as
above
Same as
above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Operation-
al status
data
Same as
above
Same as
above
Operation-
al status
data
Same as
above
ComponsaUng
Provisions
High reliability
components
Same as above
Same as above
High reliability
components
Same as above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Sanle as
above
Same as
above
Extremely
unlikely
Sam_s
above
Fun_lon
5. Scan
control
(1331129)
6. MIL-
STD 1553
interface
(1355998)
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as above Same as
above
Same as
above
* Required for performance. Procured to Aerojet specification, that requires qualification and acceptance testing including performance,
vibration, shock, acceleration, thermal cycling, and burn-in as applicable. It also includes flow down of requirements for parts, materials,
and processes control; e.g., standard parts and NHB 5300.4(3A-1)
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ID _em/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
FunoUon
See A1
Electronics
Description
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loss of
radio-
metric
data on
both 1 & 2
channels
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents
1. Analog
Multiplexer/
A/D
Converter
(1356418)
2. Memory
(1331126)
3. Timing
Control
Genera-
tion
(1331135)
4. CPU
(1356413)
5. Scan
Control
(1331129))
6. Mother
Boa_
(1331153)
7. Parallel
to Serial
Converter
(1331150)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher I Effects
Level
No useful Degraded
AMSU-A mission
data on
the 2
channels
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
No useful Degraded
AMSU-A mission
data on
the 2
channels
Same as I Same as
I
above i above
Same as Same as
: above above
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Operations
status data
Same as
above
Same as
above
Operation-
ai status
data
Operation-
al status
Operation-
ai status
Operation-
al status
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
components
Same as above
Same as above
High reliability
components
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
II Extremely
Unlikely
II Extremely
Unlikely
II Extremely
Unlikely
II Extremely
Unlikely
II Extrer_ly
Unlikely
II Extremely
Unlikely
II Extremely
Unlikely
A-24
Report10378A
March1996
System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/METSAT
Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Beam
position
data stuck
or erratic
CAUSE
1. Failure
in motor
control
circuitry
2. iai-
function or
failure in
any of the
following
compon-
ents:
Scan
control
(1331129)
Timing
control
generator
(1331135)
Command
signal
wiring
backplane
Mlsslon
Phase/Op.
Mode
See
antenna
subsystem
analysis
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Hlgher Effects
i Level
See See
antenna antenna
subsystem subsystem
analysis analysis
In- Degraded
complete mission
data
transfer
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Fallure
Detect.
Mtd.
Beam
oosition
data not
consistent
with radio-
metric
data
sequence.
Same as
above
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
circuitry
Same as above
Same as above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Same as
above
Same_s
above
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Electronics Subsystem
AE-26609
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
Loss of
any serial
readout
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
1. MIL-
STD- 1553
interface
(1355998)
2. Timing
control
generation
(1331135)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
No useful Degraded Telemetry
data from mission voltage
channels 1 status
&2.
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
CompensaUng
Provisions
High reliability
circuitry
Same as above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Same as
above
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Electronics Subsystem
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
Failure
Modes &
Causes
Mode
Loss of
any serial
readout
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
i tion or
! failure in:
1. Parallel
to serial
converter
(1331150)
2. Timing
Control
Genera-
tion
(1331135)
Mission
Phese/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
No useful Degraded
data from mission
channels
1&2
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Telemetry
voltage
status
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
circuitry
Same as above
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
Extremely
unlikely
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A2
Electronics
Failure
Modes &
Causes
Mode
Electrical
Inter-
mittent
CAUSE
Fracture of
printed
circuit
traces or
plated
through
hole.
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Worst Extremely Inter-
effect is degraded mittent or
not useful mission erratic
data on output
channels 1 data.
&2.
Compensating
Provisions
Reliable circuit
certified
processes
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
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EOS/METSAT
Receiver Subsystem
AE-26608
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Receiver
Function
The receiver
circuits
convert
microwave
energy to IF
frequencies
which are
amplified,
bandpass
filtered, and
detected prior
to processing
in the video
circuits.
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
any single
channel 6,
7or 15.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure In
one of the
following
compon-
ents.
1. Isolator
(1356680)
2. Stable
Oscillator
(133661 O)
3. Mixer/IF
Amp
(1331562)
4. Wave-
guide
attenuator
(1331509)
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mid.
6. IF
attenuator
(1331516)
7. Detector
(1331577)
MISSION Loss of Degraded Low levels
data in a mission on a single
single channel 6,
channel. 7, or 15.
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as
above above above
5. Band- MISSION Same as
pass filter above
(1331559)
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Compensating
Provisions
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
High reliability III Remote
components
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same,as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
A-30
Report10378A
March 1996
System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/METSAT
Receiver Subsystem
AE-26608
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Receiver
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
all
channels
9-14.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents:
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
1. Isolator MISSION
(1356680)
2. Hybrid MISSION
tree
(1331554)
3. PLO MISSION
(1348360)
4. Mixer/ MISSION
IF amplifier
( 1331562)
MISSION5. Wave-
guide
attenuator
(1331509)
(1331510)
6. 3-way
Power
divider
(1356669)
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level I Mtd.
Low levels Significant Low levels High reliability
or loss of degrada- on all 6 components
data on all tion of channels
6 channels mission
Same as Same as
above above
Compensating Severity Failure
Provisions Class Prob.
Remote
II Remote
Same as Same as above Same as ,,_emote*
. above above
Same as Same as : Same as _Same as above Same as Remote
above above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above above above
* Redundant PLO
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Receiver
Function Failure Mission
Modes & PhaselOp.
Causes Mode
MODE
Reduction
or loss in
either
channel 9
or 10.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure In
one of the
following
compon-
ents on
the
respective
channel
1. IF
bandpass
filter
(1331559)
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of
data in a
!single
:channel.
Degraded
mission
Same as
above
Same as
above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Low Ievel s
on a single
channel 9
or 10.
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
components
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
2. IF
amplifier
(1331579)
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as above Same as
above
Remote
Same as
above
3. I F MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above Same as Same as
attenuator above above above above above
(1331516)
4. Detector MISSION Same as Same as Same as above Same as Same as
(1331577) above above above above
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Receiver
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss all
channels
11-14
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents:
1. IF
amplifier
(1331579)
2. 4-Way
Power
divider
(1336670)
MODE
Reduction
or loss in
any single
channel
11-14
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents in the
respective
channel
1. SAW
filter
(1331576)
2. IF
amplifier
(1331579)
1 thru 12
Mission
Phaes/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Degraded
mission
Same as
above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Low levels
on all 4
channels
Loss of
data on all
four
channels
Same as
above
Same as
above
Loss of Degraded Low levels
daain a mission on single
single channel
channel. 11,12,13,
14
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
components
Same asabove
High rellablUty
components
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Same as
above
Function
3. IF
attenuator
(1331516)
4. Detector
(1331577)
MISSION
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as above
above
Same as Same as above
above
Same as Same as above
above
Remote
Sarne as
above
II Remote
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Receiver
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
High
current
drain on
DC/DC
converter
CAUSE
Leaky or
shorted
filter
capacitor
MODE
Fracture of
any wave-
guide
CAU,__E.
Loosening
or fracture
of
mounting
hardware
Mission
Phese/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Higher Significant
power dis- degraded
sipation as mission
a minimum
worst case
is loss of
all
channels
6,7,9-15
Worst Degraded
effect is mission
loss of
ability to
control
signal gain
Failure Compensating Severity Failure
Detect. Provisions Class Prob.
Mtd.
Drop in High reliability
monitored components
DC
voltage
level
Reduction Hardware uses
in signal lock nuts or
strength solithane
II Remote
II Remote
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ID Item/
No. J Funct.
!ID
A1-1
Receiver
Function
The receiver
circuits
convert
microwave
energy to IF
frequencies
which are
amplified,
bandpass
filtered, and
detected prior
to processing
in the video
circuits
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
any single
channel 3,
4,5,8.
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure In
i one of the
following
compon-
ents:
1. Isolator
(1356680)
2. Local
Oscillator
(1336610)
3. Mixer/
IF amplifier
(1331562)
4. Wave-
guide
attenuator
(1331509)
5. Band
pass filter
(1331559)
6. IF
attenuator
(1331516)
7. Detector
(1331577)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
MISSION
MISSION
Loss of Degraded Low levels
data in a mission on a single
single channel 3,
channel 4, 5, or 8
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
CompensaUng
Provisions
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
High reliability III Remote
components
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above.
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-2
Receiver
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
High
current
drain on
DC/DC
converter.
CAUSE
Leaky or
shorted
filter
capacitor.
MODE
Fracture of
any
wavegulde
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
of
mounting
hardware
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION
MISSION
Higher Significant
power dis- degraded
sipation as mission
a
minimum.
Worst
case is
loss of all
channels
3,4,5,8
Worst Degraded
case is mission
loss of
ability to
control
signal gain
Drop in
monitored
DO
voltage
level.
Reduction
; In signal
!strength
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
! components
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
solithane
Design with safety
factor uses
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2 Receiver
Function
The receiver
circuits
convert
microwave
! energy to IF
I trequandes
: which are
amplified,
bandpass
filtered, and
detected prior
to processing
in the video
circuits.
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Reduction
orloss of
any single
channel1
or 2
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
CAUSE
See
analysis for
A1 No. 2
receiver
other than
Isolator
{1331111
or 1331112)
and Wave-
guide
Attenuator
(1331100).
Others are
the same as
1356409
MISSION Degraded
mission
Loss of
data in a
single
channel
Low levels
on a single
channel 1
or 2
High reliability
components
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Remote
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A2 Receiver
Fallure
Modes &
Causes
High
current
drain on
DC/DC
converter
CAUSE
Leaky or
shorted
filter
capacitor
MODE
Fracture of
any wave-
guide
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
of
mounting
hardware
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Degraded
mission
Degraded
mission
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Drop in
monitored
DO
voltage
level.
Compensating
Provisions
High reliability
components
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
solilhane.
Failure
Prob.
Remote
MISSION
Higher
power dis-
sipation as
a
minimum.
Worst
case is
loss of
both
channels 1
and 2.
Worst
effect is
loss of
ability to
control
signal
gain.
Reduction
in signal
strength
Design with safety
factor uses
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
Sever.y
Class
Remote
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1 Antenna
Drive/
Calibration
Function Failure Mission
Modes & Phase/Op.
Causes
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
micro-
wave
energy in
channels
6,7,9-15
CAUSE
Distortion
or failure
of rotating
reflector
(1355776)
Distortion
or failure
of feed
horn &
associated
wave
guides
(1331361)
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
micro-
wave
energy In
either the
vertically
polarized
channels 6
and 15 or
horizon-
tally
polarized
channels 7
and 9-15
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Degrada- Degrada- Output Rigid, simple
tion or loss tion of data on design, weld
of sensitiv- mission channels inspected unit
ity 6, 7, 9-15 tested
shifting
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Output
data on
channels 6
& 15or
channels 7
&9-15
shifting
Rigid, simple
design, unit
inspected and
tested
Rigid simple
design, unit
inspected and
tested
Failure
Prob.
Remote
Remote
The antenna
receives
microwave
radiometric
energy, warm
and cold
calibration
references in
step
sequence.
The energy is
separated in
an orthogonal
mode trans-
ducer (OMT)
and supplied
as polarized
inputs to the
receiver.
CAUSE
Distortion
or failure
of
orthogonal
mode
trans-
ducer
(1331546)
Same as
above but
limited to
vertically
or horizon-
tally
polarized
channels
Same as
above
Severity
Class
Remote
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!ID
! No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A1-1
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Constant
signal
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents
1. Reflector
(stuck)
(1355776)
2. Motor
(1331392)
3. Motor
Driver
(1331694)
4. Resolver
(1331529)
5. R/D
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
6. Inter-
face
converter
(1331697}
7. Resolver
data isolato
(1334972)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Absence
of warm/
cold
reference
and scene
data
sequences
no beam
position
data
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of Extremely
data from degraded
channels mission
6, 7, 9-15
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
MISSION Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Design derating,
high reliability
parts, qualification
testing, and
Inspection
requirements
imposed
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Occasional
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as ; Same as
above above
MISSION Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
LOSSor
erroneous
antenna
position
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents
1. Resolver
2. R/D
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
3.1nteF
face con-
yeRer
(1331697)
4. Resolver
data isolator
(1334972)
Mlsslon
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of Degraded
capability mission
to
accurately
determine
scan
position
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Telemetry
data on
antenna
position
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
CompensaUng
Provisions
Design derating
high reliability
parts, qualifi-
cation testing and
Inspection
requirements
imposed
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Failure
Prob.
Remote*
Same as
above
Sarne as
above
Same as
above
* It may be possible for the system to interpolate from warndcold calibrate and thermal data sequence.
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?
ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
High
current
drain on
+28 VDC
pulse load
(noisy
bus)
1. Cable
short
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
3. Scan
drive input
circuitry
including
bus
selection
circuit
short
(1356002)
MISSION
2. Filter pin Same as
fault above
(1331712)
Same as
above
4. Motor
short
(1331392)
5. Motor
driver
short
(1331694)
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Increased Extremely Analog
power dis- degraded house-
sipatlon as mission keeping
a mini- telemetry
mum
worst case
is
complete
loss of
data on
channels
6,7,9-15
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as
above above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as
above above above above
Compensating Severity Failure
Provisions Class Prob.
Design,
inspection, and
test require-
ments are
imposed
II Remote*
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Extremely
above unlikely
Same as above
Same as above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Occasional
Occasional
* For causes 1, 2, and 3, short would result in automatic switching to redundant bus.
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ID Rem/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
motor from
mounting
bulkhead
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
of
mounting
bolts
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION If binding Extremely None
occurs, degraded unless
then mission severe
antenna enough to
beam cause
position is binding of
affected, reflector
Worst then motor
case is current will
useless for be higher.
channels
6,7,9-15.
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock: nuts or
I sollthane.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-1
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
other
antenna
compon-
ents (teed
horn,
MUX,
warm
load)
CAUSE
Same as
above
Mlsslon
Phsse/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
solithane.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
I Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
i A1-2 Antenna
Drive/
Calibration
Function
See A1-1
Description
Failure Mission
Modes & Phase/Op.
Causes Mode
Reduction
or loss of
micro-
wave
energy in
channels
3,4,5,&8
CAUSE MISSION
Distortion
or failure
of rotating
reflector
(1355776)
Distortion
i or failure
of feed
horn &
associated
i wave-
guides
(1331361)
MODE
Reduction
or loss of
micro-
wave
energy in
either the
i vertically
polarized
i channels
or horizon-
tally
polarized
channels
CAUSE
Distortion
or failure
of ortho-
gonal
mode
trans-
ducer
(1331507)
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
CompensaUng
Provisions
Degrada- Degreda- Output Rigid, simple
tion or loss tion of data on design, weld
of sensitiv- mission channels inspected unit
it'/ shifting tested
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Output
above but above data on
limited to channels 6
vertically & 15 or
or horizon- channels
tally shifting
polarized
channels
Rigid, simple
design, unit
inspected and
tested
Rigid simple
design, unit
inspected and
tested
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
II Remote
II Remote
II Remote
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
Constant
signal
¸CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
com-
ponents
1. Reflector
(stuck)
(1355776)
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phese/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION
2. Motor MISSION
(1331392)
3. Motor MISSION
Driver
(1331694)
4. Re.solver MISSION
(1331529)
5. R/D MISSION
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
6. Inter- MISSION
face
converter
(1331697)
7. Resolver MISSION
data isolator
(1334972)
Loss of Extremely
data from degraded
channels mission
3,4,5,8
Absence
of warm/
cold
reference
and scene
data
sequences
no beam
position
data
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above !above
Same as Same as I Same as
above above l above
Same as Same as :Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Compensating Severity Failure
Provisions Class Prob.
Design derating,
high reliability
parts
II Occasional
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loss of
erroneous
antenna
position
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents:
1. Resolver
(1331529)
2. R/D
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
3. Inter-
face con-
verter
(1331697)
4. Resolver
data isolator
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure Compensating
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect. Provisions
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION Loss of Degraded Telemetry High reliability part
capability mission data on
to antenna
accurately position
determine
scan
position
MISSION Same as ! Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above I above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
Same as
above
Same as
above
_t
Remote
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
I Same as
above
* It may be possible for the system to interpolate from warm/cold calibrate and thermal data sequence.
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
High
current
drain on
+28 VDC
pulse load
(noisy
bus)
1. Cable
short
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
2. Filter pin Same as
fault above
(1331712)
Same as
above
3. Scan
drive input
circuitry
including
bus
selection
circuit
short
(1356002)
4. Motor
short
(1331392)
5. Motor
driver
short
(1331694)
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Increased Extremely Analog Design,
power dis- degraded house- inspection, and
sipation as mission keeping test require-
a mini- telemetry merits are
mum imposed
worst case
is
complete
loss of
data on
channels
6,7,9-15
Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as Same as Same as
above above above above
Same as above
Same as above
Same as above
Severlly Failure
Class Prob.
II Remote*
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Extremely
unlikely
Occasional
OccaSional
Same as
above
Same as Same as Same as Same as
above above above above
Same as
above
* For causes 1, 2, and 3, short would result in automatic switching to redundant bus.
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ID item/
No. Funct.
ID
A1-2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
motor from
mounting
bulkhead
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
or
mounting
bolts
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission Failure
Higher Effects Detect.
Level Mid.
If binding Extremely None
occurs, degraded unless
then mission severe
antenna enough to
beam cause
position is binding of
affected, reflector
Worst then motor
case is current will
loss of be higher.
channels
3,4,5,8
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
solithane.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
II Extremely
unlikely
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A1-2
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
other
antenna
compon-
ents (feed
horn,
MUX,
warm
load).
CAUSE
Same as
above
Mission
Phese/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
so,thane.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only,
Severlly
Class
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
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ID Ilem/
No. Funct.
ID
A2 Antenna
Drive/
Calibration
Function
The antenna
receives
microwave
radiom etric
energy, warm
and cold
calibration
references in
step
sequence. A
single feed
and low-loss
diplexer
provides the
channels 1 &
2 signals.
Failure
Modes &
Causes
Reduction
or loss of
micro-
wave
energy in
channels 1
&2
.CJUZS_E
Distortion
or failure
of rotating
reflector
(PN TBD)
Distortion
or failure
of feed
horn &
associated
wave
guides
(1331231)
Distortion
or failure
of diplexer
(1331084)
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
MISSION
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
i
Degrada- 'Degrada-
tion or loss tion of
of sensttiv- mission.
ity.
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Output
data on
channels 1
&2
shifting.
Same as
above
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Rigid, simple
design, composite
reflector inspected
unit tested.
Rigid, simple
design.
Rigid, simple
design. Qual &
acceptance tested
per Specification
AE-24688
Severity Failure
Class Prob.
II Remote
II Remote
II Remote
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ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A2
Failure Mission
Modes & Phase/Op.
Causes Mode
Constant
signal
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
com-
ponems
I.Reflector MISSION
(stuck)
(1333225)
2. Motor MISSION
(1333648)
3. Motor MISSION
Driver
(1331694)
4. Rasolver MISSION
(1331529)
5. R/D MISSION
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
6. Inter- MISSION
face
converter
(1331697)
7. Resolver
data isolato
(1334972)
Failure Effects
Failure
Detect.
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Level
Loss of Extremely
data from degraded
channels 1 mission.
&2.
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Same as Same as
above above
Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Failure
Prob.
Absence
of warm/
cold
reference
and scene
data
sequences
no beam
position
data.
Design derating,
high reliability
parts, qualification
testing, and
inspection
requirements
imposed.
Severity
Class
Occasional
Same as Same asabove Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above
Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above
Same as aboveSame as
above
Same as
i above
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as above
Same as
above
Same as
above
MISSION Same as Same as above Same as Same as
above above above
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ID item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loss of
erroneous
antenna
position
data
CAUSE
Malfunc-
tion or
failure in
one of the
following
compon-
ents
1. Resolver
(1331529)
2.R/D
Converter
Oscillator
(1337739)
3. Inter-
face con-
verter
(1331697)
4. Resolver
data isolatoi
(1334972)
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure Compensating
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect. Provisions
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION Loss of Degraded Telemetry High reliability pan
capability mission data on
to antenna
accurately position
determine
scan
position
MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
MISSION Same as Same as Same as Same as above
above above above
Severity
Class
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
:Failure
Prob.
Remote*
Same as
above
Same as
above
Same as
above
* It may be possible for the system to interpolate from warm]cold calibrate and thermal data sequence.
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
: Function Failure
Modes &
Mission
Phase/Op.
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Causes Mode Level
Extremely
degraded
mission
Same as
above
Same as
above
MODE
High
current
drain on
+28VDC
pulse load
(noisy
bus)
1. Cable
shoM
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Analog
house-
keeping
telemetry
Same as
above
Same as
above
Compensating
Provisions
Failure
Prob.
Design,
inspection, and
test require-
ments are
imposed
Severity
Class
Remote*
Same as above Same as Same as
above above
Same as above Same as Extremely
above unlikely
Same as above Occasional
Occa_onal
Increased
power dis-
sipation as
a mini-
mum
worst case
is
complete
loss of
data on
channels 1
&2
2. Filter pin Sameas Sameas
fault above above
(133131_
Same as Same as
above above
Same as
above
3. Scan
drive input
circuitry
including
bus
selection
circuit
short
(1356002)
4. Motor Same as Same as Same as
short above above above
(1333648)
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
5. Motor
driver
short
(1331694)
Same as
above
Same as above
Same as
above
Same as
above
* For causes 1, 2, and 3, short would result in automatic switching to redundant bus.
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"I
System
Indenture Level
Reference Drawing
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EOS/METSAT
Antenna Subsystem
AE-26607
ID
No.
Item/ Function
Funct.
ID
A2
Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
motor from
mounting
bulkhead.
CAUSE
Loosening
or fracture
or
mounting
bolts.
Mission
Phase/Op.
Mode
MISSION
Failure Effects
Next Mission
Higher Effects
Extremely
degraded
mission.
Failure
Detect.
Mtd.
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
solithane.
Failure
Prob.
Level
If binding
occurs,
then
antenna
beam
position is
affected.
Worst
case is
useless
channels 1
&2.
None
unless
severe
enough to
cause
binding of
reflector
then motor
current will
be higher.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
quaUlied hardware
only.
Severity
Class
Extremely
unlikely
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ID Item/
No. Funct.
ID
A2
Function Failure
Modes &
Causes
MODE
Loosening
or separa-
tion of
other
antenna
compon-
ents (feed
horn,
MUX,
warm
load).
CAUSE
Same as
above
Failure Effects
Mission Next Mission Failure
Phase/Op. Higher Effects Detect.
Mode Level Mtd.
MISSION
Same as Same as Same as
above above above
Compensating
Provisions
Hardware uses
lock nuts or
i solithane.
Design with safety
factor use
adequate thread
insertion. Use
qualified hardware
only.
Severity
Class
Failure
Prob.
Extremely
unlikely
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APPENDIX B
INTEGRATED ADVANCED MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT-A
(AMSU-A)
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
for EOS/METSAT
Contract No: NAS 5-32314
CDRL: 507
FINAL SUBMITTAL
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This Critical Item List (CIL) for the EOS and METSAT AMSU-A instruments provides a
list of those items that are considered critical. The list provides the justification and compensating
provisions that are utilized to reduce or eliminate the effects of each critical item on AMSU-A performance
or reliability.
Critical Item Definition
A critical item is defined as any item whose severity category is identified as being a
potentially catastrophic (Criticality 1) or critical (Criticality 2) failure.
Critical Items List
The Critical Items List (Table B-l) is in contractor format - columnar form with Item,
Description, Drawing Number, and Severity Category, and includes Justification/Compensation provisions.
Items unique to either EOS or METSAT are identified as to location in the description column.
Severity Levels
Identification of mission-critical items is provided on each worksheet by assigning a severity
category to each failure mode. The severity classifications are as defined in PAR GSFC-S-480-79,
Paragraph 7.3.1.
Criticality 1.- A single failure that could result in loss of human life or
serious injury to personnel, or loss of a launch facility, the launch vehicle, or
a primary mission objective. For failures involving potential loss of life or
serious injury to personnel, redundant design, both of which if failed would
result in a Criticality 1 failure, shall be considered Criticality 1.)
II Criticality 2.- A single failure that could result in damage to a launch
facility or launch vehicle, significant degradation of science products (as
defined by the Project), or loss of a secondary mission objective.
III Criticality 3.- Loss of redundancy or an effect less severe than that of a
Criticality 2 failure mode.
B-2
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13
14
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16
17
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Table B-1 Critical Items List
Description Drawing Number
ND Converter Analog
Multiplexer
Memo_
1356418
(AE-26123)
1331126 CCA
_ming and Control 1331135 CCA
CPU 1356413 CCA
Scan Control 1331129 CCA
Cable
Filter Pin Connector
DC/DC Converter
Filter Capacitor
Bolts
MI L-STD- 1553
Interface(EOS)
Rotating Reflector
Assembly
Feed Horn &
Waveguide
Assemblies
5-Port Multiplexer
(Orthogonal Mode
Transducer)
Reflector (A1)
Reflector (A2)
Motor
1331712
1331719
1356010
(AE-26577)
1355998 CCA
1333647
1333651
1331410
1331_1
1331_1
1331646
13557_
1355835
1331392
(AE-24690)
1333648
(AE-26052)
Severity Justification Compensation Provisions
I Required to meet design criteria/Procured to Aerojet
specifications that flow down the necessary requirements
for procurement of a high reliability part. Stress analysis
verifies that parts are derated well within requirements. A
Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) will be performed to
confirm the acceptability of the manufacturer's processes.
Submitted to GSFC as NSPAR 081 on NOAA/AMSU
Program.
Required to meet design criteda/Use highreliabilityparts,
apply derating per PPL-20 and MIL-STD-975. Stress
analysis vedfies parts derated well within requirements.
Use polyamide material for the CCA' (designed to GSFC
approved requirements) and procure to drawings and
specifications that flow down requirements to control
manufacturing. Extensive subassembly level testing,
including thermal cycling.
Same as item 2
Same as Item 2
Same as Item 2
Design, inspect, and test to EOS/AMSU-A requirements.
Use qualified material. Fabricate and assemble to
approved procedures.
Procure to controlled requirements 100% inspection of
connectors filter pins; use connector savers.
Required to meet design criteria/Procured to Aerojet
specification that requires qualification and acceptance
testing; includes performance and environmental testing.
Also includes flow down of applicable parts, materials, and
processes requirements.
Required to meet design critaria/procured to high reliability
requirements. Stress analysis vedfles parts darating within
requirements.
Required to meet design criteria/Procured to controlled
requirements, derated with design safety margins controlled
torque requirements; required thread engagement.
Note: Does not include S/C interface bolts furnished and
controlled by spacecraft contractor.
Same as Item #2
Use rigid simple design and inspection; unit tested as
subassembly; procure to defined and approved drawings
and specifications.
Same as Item #12
Same as Item #8
Same as Item #12
Same as Item #12
Same as Item #8
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Item #
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Description Drawing Number Severity Justification/Compensation Provisions
1331694 Same as Item #2Motor Driver
Assembly CCA
Resolver 1333638 Same as Item #8
RID Converter 1337739 II Same as Item #1
Oscillator Submitted to GSFC as NSPAR NA028 on NOAA/AMSU
Program
Interface Converter 1331697 II Same as Item #2
CCA
3 Port Diplexer 1331084 II Same as Item #8
(AE-24688)
W.G. Isolator 1331111 II Same as Item #8
1331112
135668O
(AE-26025)
V-Band Hybrid Tee 1331554 II Same as Item #8
(AE-25022)
Phase-Locked 1348360 II Same as Item #8
Oscillator (AE-26633)
I,F. Amplifier 1331579 II Same as Item #8
(AE-24684)
I.F. Power Dividers 1356689 II Same as Item #8
1356690
(AE-24867)
/
I.F. Filter 1331559 II Same as Item #8
(AE-24687)
I.F. Attenuator II Same as Item #8
R.F. Detector
1331516
(AE-24868)
1331577
(AE-24694)
Same as Item #8
Submitted to GSFC as NSPAR AC032 on NOANAMSU
Program
SAW Filter 1331576 II Same as Item #8
(AE-24937)
Parallel to Series 1331150 I Same as Item #2
Converter CCA
(METSAT)
S/C Interface #1 CCA 1331144 II Same as Item #2
(METSAT)
S/C Interface #2 CCA 1331147 II Same as Item #2
(METSAT)
Compensation Motor 1333550 II Required to meet design criteria/Procured to Aero;t
(METSAT) specification that requires Qualification and Acceptance
tasting; includes performance and environmental testing.
Also includes flow down of applicable parts, materials, and
processes.
GDOUItraStable 1331553 II Required to meet design criteria/Procured to Aerojet
(METSAT) (AE-24683 specification that requires Qualification and Acceptance
testing; includes performance and environmental testing.
Also includes flow down of applicable parts, materials, and
processes.
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